This week, Moscow will host the third Russia-Africa summit, bringing together African leaders as President Vladimir Putin seeks to expand Russia’s economic, military and political reach across the continent. Yet Russia’s growing influence has done far more to advance Moscow’s interests and protect allied rulers than to deliver the prosperity and security promised to ordinary Africans.
Putin is scheduled to cochair Thursday’s plenary session with Burundian President Evariste Ndayishimiye, current chair of the African Union. Alongside the summit, a two-day economic and humanitarian forum will discuss investment, industrial production, food security, energy, technology and payment systems. Organisers have placed trade and investment at the centre of the programme with a new plan for 2027-2029 expected to advance what they call “mutually beneficial cooperation”.
On August 20, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Maria Zakharova outlined plans for another substantial round of intergovernmental agreements and commercial contracts at the Moscow summit. The Sochi gathering in October 2019 produced 92 agreements, and Putin pledged to double annual trade to $40bn. Four years later, the July 2023 summit in St Petersburg yielded 161 more accords and a 2023-2026 action plan.
The economic results have not matched Moscow’s promises. As the 2023-2026 plan nears its conclusion, Russia’s own trade statistics expose the shortfall: Merchandise trade with Africa reached just $27.1bn in 2025 against Putin’s $40bn target.
The trade imbalance persisted into 2026 with Russia exporting $14bn in goods to Africa during the first eight months of the year while importing just $3.2bn.
Agricultural exports help explain Africa’s significant trade deficit with Russia. In the first half of 2026 alone, Russia shipped 10.2 million tonnes of wheat to Africa, with Egypt its largest agricultural customer. These supplies meet genuine food security needs, but exports of wheat and fertiliser benefit Russian producers more than they contribute to African industrial development.
Russia’s investment record exposes a substantial gap between agreements signed and projects completed. At the 2019 summit, fertiliser producer Uralchem and Angola’s Grupo Opaia agreed to build a $1.2bn ammonia and urea complex, scheduled to begin production in 2023, but Uralchem abandoned the venture that year.
Egypt offers clearer evidence of progress: Rosatom is building four nuclear reactors at El Dabaa, where more than 18,000 Egyptians are employed in their construction. But the project is being financed largely through a $25bn Russian loan that Egypt must repay with interest.
Even when Russian-backed projects advance, the contract terms determine who stands to benefit, who bears the financial risks and how public revenues will ultimately be shared. In the Republic of Congo, a proposed petroleum-products pipeline between Pointe-Noire and Brazzaville would give Russian interests 90 percent of the joint venture and Congo’s state oil company 10 percent with a 25-year concession and guaranteed transport tariffs.
In April, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said design work would begin this year with operations planned for 2029. Russian officials have also described the pipeline as a means of protecting petroleum exports from Western sanctions imposed following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Russia’s commercial ambitions are matched by a widening military footprint. On October 8, Sweden’s Defence Research Agency identified at least 57 Russian military and security agreements involving 39 African countries, although many remain limited in practice. Others facilitate training and access to military infrastructure.
Russia initially relied on the Wagner Group, a Kremlin-linked mercenary network, before transferring many operations to the Ministry of Defence-controlled Africa Corps with Wagner remaining active in the Central African Republic. Russian personnel provide direct combat assistance, training and protection to allied governments, particularly in Mali and the Central African Republic.
Nonetheless, Mali exposes the limits of Russia’s military assistance. Wagner fighters and Malian troops captured Kidal, a strategic northern city, in November 2023, only to lose it to separatist rebels in April 2026. On October 6, Russian-backed forces regained the city after an air campaign prompted the rebels to withdraw. Moscow has helped Mali win territory, but it has failed to deliver lasting security for Malians.
According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, Malian forces and Russia’s Africa Corps carried out 49 air strikes from April to August, killing 89 civilians. Human Rights Watch reported that on July 10, Africa Corps fighters killed nine people, including four children, and burned homes in Bombori, a village in central Mali’s Mopti region.
Other abuses include beatings, electric shocks and waterboarding of noncombatants detained by Malian soldiers and Africa Corps personnel at a military base in Sevare from May to August.
For civilians caught between insurgents and forces sent to defeat them, Moscow’s military assistance has brought more violence and no dependable protection.
At the same time, Russia has proved its value to allied rulers in the region.
On August 29, Russia’s Africa Corps helped General Abdourahamane Tiani crush a mutiny in Niger. Russian troops provided ground and aerial support, and Moscow’s ambassador confirmed their role. While Tiani’s government survived, Nigeriens remain without political parties or an election timetable, and civil liberties are severely restricted. The junta also stripped five more exiled critics of their nationality on September 17.
In the Central African Republic, Moscow has helped President Faustin-Archange Touadera, in power for 10 years, tighten his grip on the country. On March 5, Touadera personally thanked Putin, acknowledging that Russian security forces had made possible December’s presidential election, which secured his third term despite an opposition boycott.
Wagner mercenaries continue to protect Touadera’s government while political opponents face repression and journalists risk arrest. Russian fighters have carried out killings, torture and attacks against civilians.
For continued protection of Touadera’s government, Moscow reportedly demanded close to 14 million euros ($15.7m) a month to deploy Africa Corps in place of Wagner while Russian-linked companies continued profiting from the Central African Republic’s gold resources.
Moscow is also helping friendly rulers shape the information their citizens receive. In July, Russia’s state broadcaster RT signed a content-sharing agreement with Tafouk TV, the new channel run by the military governments of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.
Broadcasting from Bamako since September, the station promotes official military successes, often overlooking insurgent attacks, while local journalists face arrests, disappearances and censorship. Moscow’s campaign to shape African public opinion extends beyond state broadcasters. An April 3 investigation by France 24 uncovered nearly 650 pro-Russian articles placed in 35 West African media outlets from June to October 2024. Leaked documents listed payments of $250 to $700 per article with some outlets unaware that Russian operatives had arranged the placements.
Russian-linked efforts to shape African politics are not confined to news media. In July, an Angolan court convicted two Russians associated with Africa Politology, a political influence network with ties to the Kremlin, of terrorism and espionage. Prosecutors accused them of exploiting protests over fuel prices to incite antigovernment unrest and attempting to sway Angola’s 2027 election. Igor Ratchin received an 11-year prison sentence and Lev Lakshtanov eight years, but both denied the charges and appealed.
Russia’s expanding presence is entrenching a deeply unequal and destabilising relationship in which Moscow gains preferential access to African mineral resources, strengthens its military foothold and protects illiberal rulers.
Meanwhile, ordinary Africans are forced to endure insecurity, political repression and unfulfilled development commitments. Far from delivering shared prosperity, the Kremlin is exploiting Africa’s wealth and political vulnerabilities to advance its own economic and geopolitical interests.
No power, regardless of history, deserves exemptions.
In Moscow, Africa must demand of Russia the same standards it expects of the United States, Europe and China: fair trade, productive investment, respect for sovereignty and accountability for civilian abuses.
African lives matter, too.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
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