The resurgence of coups in the West African subregion, exemplified by the coup in Guinea-Bissau and the thwarted coup in the Republic of Benin, indicates a decline of political legitimacy, a breakdown of constitutional order and a probable regional disintegration.
On 26 November 2025, Guinea-Bissau became the fifth country out of 15 in the subregion to come under military rule since 2020, marking a significant expansion of the coup belt. This expansion arguably indicates a breakdown in public trust in the administrative capabilities of civilian governments.
According to Ornella Moderan and Fahiraman Koné of the Institute for Security Studies, in a 2022 article, increasing coups reflect a major crisis in West Africa’s political systems, which are not meeting the people’s expectations and are characterised by systemic corruption.
“They indicate a need to rethink democratic models – not just elections, but also the effectiveness of institutions that are supposed to protect and serve citizens,” they said.
Legitimacy Crisis
From Mali to Guinea, from Burkina Faso to Niger and most recently, Guinea-Bissau, West Africa has seen a decisive and perhaps persistent shift to military-led transitions despite ECOWAS’s or national governments’ use of force to neutralise coups in The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and most recently in the Republic of Benin.
“We have continued to witness political practices that violate some of these principles,” ECOWAS Commission’s president, Alieu Touray, said during the 55th ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council session. He noted that elections have become a major trigger of instability in the subregion, despite the best efforts to establish constitutional convergence principles.
While citizens expect that periodic elections will be followed by effective governance that addresses their needs, the reality of humanitarian and security crises has resulted in what Confidence McHarry of SBM Intelligence, a Nigerian-based Intelligence consulting firm, describes as a “…growing disillusionment with the African version of democracy.”
Humanitarian, economic, and security crises are some of the major drivers of citizen dissatisfaction with civilian government. Military officers are better positioned to shun inhibitors such as corruption to deliver on governance that protects and prioritises the populace.
As of October 2025, data from the UNHCR showed that approximately 7.6 million West Africans are forcibly displaced across the subregion. This is an increase from the previous 7.4 million recorded in March 2025. Of the 7.6 million, 6.5 million are internally displaced, with Nigeria, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso accounting for the highest number.
Despite the acceleration of regional fragmentation, ECOWAS’ response remains the same.
ECOWAS Perceived Inconsistency
Inconsistencies in ECOWAS’ responses to coups and the failure of civilian governments to deliver on electoral mandates have become a critical driver of the ongoing political upheaval in the subregion.
Each coup in the subregion is met with sanctions against erring members, including suspending them from the regional body as a deterrent. However, for cases of prolonged time in office through constitutional manipulations, institutional alignment favours the culprits through silence or attendance at inauguration ceremonies.
President Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire has been president since 2010 and recently won a fourth term.
Under the Ivorian constitution, presidents serve a maximum of two terms, but Mr Ouattara argues his limit was “reset” by a 2016 constitutional overhaul.
The absence of institutional reprimand for constitutional coups creates perceived inconsistency in addressing issues of democracy and governance.
Similarly, in Togo, a new constitution has allowed Togo’s long-time head of state, Faure Gnassingbé, to shift to a new role of prime minister in a bid to escape the constraint of presidential term limits. Faure Gnassingbé succeeded his father, Gnassingbé Éyadéma, a military officer and politician who served as the third president of Togo following a coup in 1967.
This historical trend of executive power consolidation undermines ECOWAS’ Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.
As a result of events such as those described above, sanctions do not have the desired effect. Rather, they appear to be encouraging putschists.
Speaking to PREMIUM TIMES, Paul Melly, a Chatham House Fellow, opines that sanctions have failed to deter coups; if anything, they appear to encourage them.
“Sanctions can actually strengthen coup leaders because they mostly hurt the general population, and this boosts resentment of outside actors that impose sanctions, such as ECOWAS and boosts national feeling in support of the soldiers who have seized power,” he said.
For instance, a Burkinabe, who, for security concerns, asked to remain anonymous, told this newspaper that the majority of the population agreed with Burkina Faso’s withdrawal from ECOWAS because they believe that Burkina Faso must free itself from foreign pressure.
Echoing Mr Melly, Mr McHarry of SBM Intelligence said, “Sanctions are ineffective given the reduced trade connectivity in the region, in addition to growing external geopolitical competition, which is leading to more options for would-be juntas.”
Only ten days after ECOWAS suspended Guinea-Bissau from the bloc, military officers in the Republic of Benin attempted to overthrow President Patrice Talon in an abortive coup.
Regional Fragmentation
Some sanctions are stricter than others, as in the case of Niger, where electricity was cut off, and borders closed, culminating in the exit of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from ECOWAS and the formation of a confederation, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
This fragmentation that followed the coups highlights the breakdown in regional cooperation and trust.
According to a former Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, in a 7 December 2025, Toyin Falola Interview, “…I’m an optimist, but the AES do not want to hear anything about ECOWAS. There are three leaders in West Africa that they do not want to hear about: Nigeria, the Republic of Benin, and Senegal.”
In December 2024, Niger’s military leader, Abdourahmane Tchiani, accused Nigeria of colluding with France to destabilise Niger, indicating a breakdown in regional trust, despite providing no evidence.
In a further breakdown of cooperation, while ECOWAS anticipated the possible return of the three states by continuing the free movement policy, the AES imposed a 0.5 per cent import duty on goods from ECOWAS. This move truncates 50 years of working to achieve a borderless bloc.
Just recently, a Nigerian Air Force aircraft was held in Burkina Faso for violation of international aviation protocol and infringement on the latter’s sovereignty.
The aircraft and the military officers, according to the Nigerian government, were en route to a mission in Portugal before an emergency landing, which they insisted complied with international aviation safety rules. Showing a lack of cooperation, the aircraft and its passengers were arrested for over a week until a high-level delegation from Nigeria, led by the country’s minister of foreign affairs, paid a visit to Burkina Faso.
Residents of the breakaway states also face challenges in trade, which consequently affects the standard of living in these countries.
The Burkinabe who spoke anonymously to EIR said, “Overall, things are fine, but there have been some mixed reactions from merchants regarding the free movement of their goods.”
The breakaway states account for 16 per cent of ECOWAS’s population of 424 million and seven per cent of its GDP. Their exit also saw the relocation of ECOWAS institutes, which could be good sources of tourism revenue for these countries.
The West African Health Organisation (WAHO), located in Burkina Faso; ECOWAS Youth and Sports Development Centre (EYSDC), located in Burkina Faso; Water Resource Management Centre (WRMC), located in Burkina Faso; and Regional Animal Health Centre (RAHC), located in Mali, have been moved to other countries.
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The future
The future and fate of democracy in West Africa poses an existential question for the subregion.
“ECOWAS is in tatters,” Mr Obasanjo said in the aforementioned interview.
The ECOWAS Commission President, Alieu Touray, agreed with Mr Obasanjo when he called for introspection on the future of our democracy and the urgent need to invest in the security of the community during the 55th ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council session.
To reverse the coup trend and chart a more democratic course for the bloc, Mr McHarry recommends that ECOWAS must change its coup response mechanism by tilting the Lagos Treaty such that both constitutional coups and military takeovers are met with similar disapproval.
Mr Melly told PREMIUM TIMES that ECOWAS must now translate its 50th anniversary slogan of an ECOWAS for the people into a reality, which should mean more practical benefits, in trade, better infrastructure, growth and jobs, but also a government that more fully lives up to the democratic standards that ECOWAS proclaims as against a system where electoral processes are infringed or human rights abused, particularly by incumbent governments.
Failure to fix the systemic challenges will only lead to further fragmentation of the bloc as the AES looks to Russia and China for both trade and security investments following their rejection of partnership and support from the West.
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